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Editorial

NOT the least agreeable part of writing an autobiography must be browsing over possible titles with a view to selecting a winner. Those most fancied nowadays are of a recondite character, because the plain ones, such as "Threescore Years and Ten", have all been used up. At least, so it seemed. But Dr A. V. Baillie, formerly Dean of Windsor, has hit on the happiest of titles—*My First Eighty Years*[1]: —one that is as plain as it could be, and yet at once tells the reader much more about the author than that he is an octogenarian.

He was in fact born in 1864, and he says that "every man of eighty-five is justified in writing the story of his life". Whether or not that be so, there are few men of eighty-five who could write a book so full of interest, so free from blemishes and so distinguished in style as this. Not only has Dr Baillie's life covered a long span—he remembers the Franco-Prussian war—but it has brought him into direct contact with an extraordinary variety of people in every rank of society both at home and abroad. He started with great advantages—Queen Victoria was his godmother, and Dean Stanley was his uncle—and fortune has smiled on him pretty consistently. His secret has been an intense interest in people and a genius for friendship. Among his close friends have been members of the British and foreign royal families, eminent soldiers, diplomatists, ecclesiastics, musicians, actors, boxers, as well as dockers, railwaymen and all kinds of men in the street. He appears to have been equally devoted to them all as they were to him. There is no trace of pomposity or snobbishness in this autobiography, though there is an aroma of complacency. The book is full of character sketches, deftly drawn, and of reminiscences of persons, places and events which throw a revealing light on the social history of several generations. One of its great merits is that the author never dwells for too long on any one subject. He seldom moralizes; when he does, his reflections on affairs are shrewd and urbane, though it cannot be said that they are strikingly profound.

"My ignorance of the workaday world of a clergyman was responsible for my having no real affinity with the ecclesiastical mind all through my life", says Dr Baillie, and he very fairly adds that this is "a tendency which has its good as well as its bad side". He never sought the easy paths that were open in his time to well-born clerics. He worked in the worst of slums and the least inviting type of parish, till he was appointed rector of Rugby, where he did his most constructive work in developing the activities of the Church on the lines that were then deemed most progressive. Rugby became the model of

[1] John Murray. 21s.

a large parish, efficiently organized. In spite of this and of the work he did subsequently at Coventry in preparing the ground for the inauguration of a new diocese, Dr Baillie is justified in saying that he had "no real affinity with the ecclesiastical mind", and as Dean of Windsor he was happily exempt from any need to reproach himself for this deficiency. He was entirely free from the temper of professional sacerdotalism, and was never much interested in ecclesiastical party politics; it was as an unpretentious and indefatigable pastor that he excelled. His story raises the question whether the Church of England would not now have a stronger hold on the life of the nation if it recruited more clergymen who, being without theological sophistication and attachment to doctrinaire causes, were primarily interested in the welfare of all sorts and conditions of men, both as individual persons and in their social relationships.

Great Preachers—XII. Phillips Brooks

It is nearly sixty years since Phillips Brooks died. But to those who remember hearing him preach he is still a vivid and living presence. They kindle at the thought of him. I recall as typical a distinguished resident of the Middle West, who had been a member of the Cabinet of a President of the United States and had declined an offer of appointment to the United States Supreme Court. He had heard Phillips Brooks on one occasion only. But what Brooks said that morning, what Brooks himself was, what he introduced this man to, became the source of spiritual sustenance and strength for the remainder of a long and exceedingly useful life of fourscore and ten years. He could never mention Brooks without profound feeling. "Nothing kindles fire but fire." This incident could be multiplied indefinitely in the Church and out of it, and not only among those who remember him in the flesh, but also those who have met him in spirit through his sermons or biography. And many men in the Christian ministry to-day would say that Phillips Brooks was a major factor in their decision. For in Brooks they saw the ministry, its possibilities and potential power, revealed on the very highest level, and were moved to follow after. This influence continues to-day. A few months ago the editors of *Religion in Life* asked twenty-five prominent Protestant ministers to list the ten books which had influenced them the most. Phillips Brooks, his biography or his sermons, was mentioned almost twice as many times as any other book or person. And a volume, *Phillips Brooks: Selected Sermons*, recently published, was at once adopted and distributed by the Religious Book-of-the-Month Club.

As a preacher Phillips Brooks is unequalled in this Church: there has been nothing to compare to this tradition. Never has preaching been sustained for so long on so high a level. Indeed, a great church historian said there has scarcely been anything like it in the history of the Christian Church. One who for over forty years has been a

vital factor in the Episcopal Theological School, at the gate of Harvard University in Cambridge, and has had unique opportunity to know preachers and preaching, said not long ago that when asked whether so-and-so did not preach like Phillips Brooks it seemed ungracious to reply as she must, "No! No one preaches like Phillips Brooks. He was *sui generis*."

Certainly the comments of his contemporaries indicate that in a day of great preachers he was pre-eminent. Two voices from across the Atlantic join the chorus of praise. Dr Tulloch, Principal of St Mary's College in the University of St Andrew's, himself distinguished as a preacher, Chaplain to the Queen, Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, unsurpassed as a critic, wrote to his wife: "I have just heard the most remarkable sermon I ever heard in my life (I use the word in no American sense!) from Mr Phillips Brooks, an Episcopal clergyman here; equal to the best of Frederick Robertson's sermons, with a vigour and force of thought he has not always. I never heard preaching like it, and you know how slow I am to praise preachers. So much thought and so much life combined; such a reach of mind, and such a depth and insight of soul. I was electrified. I could have got up and shouted."[1] And James Bryce, Ambassador to the United States, comparing Brooks to other great preachers of the day—Spurgeon, Liddon, Beecher, Wilberforce —said that while these men were rhetorically more effective than Brooks, yet he spoke more directly to the soul than they; they never quite seemed to have forgotten themselves, while with Brooks there was no sign of art, no slightest touch of self-consciousness: "He spoke to his audience as a man might speak to his friends, pouring forth with swift yet quiet and seldom impassioned earnestness the thoughts and feelings of a singularly pure and lofty spirit . . . Dr Brooks was the best because the most edifying of preachers. . . . In this blending of perfect simplicity of treatment with singular fertility and elevation of thought, no other among the famous preachers of the generation that is now vanishing approached him." Bishop Lawrence, Brooks' successor as Bishop of Massachusetts, adds a significant comment: that, while Brooks was popularly known as a great preacher, in all his varied, intimate relations with him he could never discover that Brooks thought so. The story is told of a group of clergy discussing the difficulty of getting people to attend evening services. Phillips Brooks, then bishop, said, "I don't know what you men are talking about: I come to your churches and find them full!"

It is not surprising that those of his contemporaries who wrote of Brooks as preacher always begin by describing the man himself as though he were part of his message, as indeed he was. For here was a man uniquely endowed by God in body, mind, and spirit. Physically he was superb. Six feet four inches in height, he weighed three hundred pounds. But the impression was of massiveness, no corpulence, a symmetrical massiveness of build. His head was large and

[1] Much of the material for this article is taken from Dr A. V. G. Allen's magnificent biography of Phillips Brooks or from *Phillips Brooks: Selected Sermons*, both published by E. P. Dutton and Co., New York.

magnificently modelled, his eyes big, dark and glowing. His face had remarkable strength and gentleness, dignity and beauty. After sitting across a dinner table from Brooks one evening, hardly able to take his eyes from him, Justice Harlan of the United States Supreme Court exclaimed to a friend, "He is the most beautiful man I have ever seen." The sight of this commanding figure, clad in a black preacher's gown, striding swiftly across the chancel of Trinity Church, mounting the steps of the pulpit, and then with great head thrown back beginning his sermon with a rush of words, "like an express train speeding through a station", was in itself an experience, stirring, unforgettable. A reporter for the *New York Sun*, hearing Brooks at a noonday service in old Trinity Church at the head of Wall Street, said, "His very first sentence was uttered with that mighty impetuosity of thought and speech which distinguishes him . . . and makes it impossible for the swiftest stenographer completely to report him . . . a Niagara of thoughts and words maintained from the beginning to the end. . . . His voice is peculiarly sympathetic and sweet . . . his tones mellow and a delight to the ear. . . . so melodious that they seem almost like the intoning of his discourse." Opinions differ regarding the voice. One friend feels as did this reporter: "It was a wonderful voice, the note thrilling and clear, and a real factor in his influence over an audience." But another who was very close to him says that while it was a fine voice and on the whole a worthy instrument for his matchless eloquence, yet there was nothing distinguished about it. Indeed at times it was a source of weakness and it was necessary for him to take lessons in its use. The first time he preached in Westminster Abbey his voice broke in the middle of his sermon and for several minutes he talked on with no one able to hear a word: "It seemed an hour", said a friend. Then the voice gathered volume, and he was "off" again, like an arrow.

The impression his personality made on his listeners was one of complete moral and spiritual integrity. He was an utterly transparent man: there was no guile in him. "How wretched I should be", he once exclaimed, "if I felt that I was carrying about with me any secret which I should not be willing that all the world should know." Not only moral but also complete intellectual integrity. It was a day when the writings of Darwin and the discoveries of science were opening up new intellectual horizons and in the process sapping at some of the old bulwarks of faith and weakening props which had undergirded certain religious points of view. While older people were reasonably content to "faintly trust the larger hope", young people were bewildered and at sea. Brooks, his mind always open to truth from whatever direction it might come, dodged no issues, but laboured prodigiously to master the new knowledge, seeking in it fresh revelations of God's will and purpose which he might interpret to his people. It was this utter integrity, moral and intellectual, which people felt in him. They sensed a personality wholly surrendered to God, an unobstructed channel for the working of his Spirit.

This was as it should be. In his *Lectures on Preaching*, which are really the self-revelation of a great preacher, his thesis is that preach-

ing is the communication of truth by man to men: there is a man behind every sermon: truth must really come through the person, not just over his lips or through his pen: it must come through his character, his affections, his whole intellectual and moral being, genuinely through him. Here is the difference, he maintained, between two preachers: the Gospel has come over one, and reaches us tinged and flavoured with his superficial characteristics, belittled with his intelligence; it comes to us through the other, impressed and winged with all the strength and earnestness that is in him. And those who listened to Phillips Brooks were caught up in the conviction that the man behind the sermon was a totally consecrated man, a responsive instrument in the hand of God, and that his sermons were true expressions of the preacher's inner life.

No small part of Phillips Brooks' power as a preacher stemmed from his love of people. He really cared profoundly, and he drew his message from them. In his own mind he was first and foremost not preacher but parish minister. When at a meeting of the Boston Clericus some were extolling preaching as the great requirement of the ministry, Brooks contained himself as long as possible, but finally burst out with an abrupt demurrer, "I would like to do nothing more than make pastoral calls and meet people. Indeed, if I did not I could not preach." One fall on his return from Europe he wrote to a friend, "The old round of parish duties which I have gone to afresh every autumn for twelve years has opened again, and I have been rather surprised at myself to find that I take it up with just as much interest as ever. . . . I am more and more glad that I am a parson." It was his custom on Saturday afternoons to walk through the crowded streets of downtown Boston, simply watching the people, looking into their faces, trying to read and feel their needs and aspirations. This was a necessary preparation for his preaching the next day. There is another instance of this. The death of Abraham Lincoln moved Brooks profoundly. He had early sensed Lincoln's worth and been convinced that he was the man to follow. After Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation had set Brooks' mind completely free, he threw himself into the cause for which Lincoln was contending—freedom for the slaves—with all his soul and mind and strength, bringing to bear on it all his great gifts of intellect and speech. (Full freedom for those of Negro descent has not as yet been achieved: but the tide is now moving swiftly in the United States towards that full freedom and equality: nothing can stop it.)

He felt deeply what he himself called the "burden of souls". He had a profound sense of the enormous value and sacredness of human personality, a high estimate of man's spiritual nature and possibilities. It was reported to Brooks at one time that someone had said that the greatest impression he had from Brooks' preaching was his deep and overpowering love for his congregation. He was visibly moved, and remarked that he would rather this was said of him than anything else. To him as he stood in the pulpit the congregation became "one impressive, pleading man", reaching out his hands for the satisfaction of his need. He had that quality which "kindles at

the sight of men", senses their needs, and is on fire to help satisfy their longings. And there was in his preaching a solid, buoyant hopefulness, a note sorely needed in much of the preaching of to-day with its overpowering emphasis on man as sinner. No one knew better than Brooks that man is sinner: but he knew also that man is more than that—a son of God, a child of the Most High. And to that he constantly appealed, evoking an immense response.

But with all his varied gifts he was primarily preacher. In a world of rapidly shifting thought he was seeking new light from God that he might feed his people. He read extensively, in many fields. A successor of Phillips Brooks at Trinity Church, Boston, writes: "I am impressed by the depth and range of his reading. Some of his books are still here in my study, carefully annotated. Few men to-day cover anything like the ground that he covered." He travelled widely. Every other summer he went abroad, most frequently to England, which he loved. Twice in the course of his ministry he took a year's leave of absence for travel, in 1865 and again in 1882. His mind was thus well stored. And in itself it was a mind of the first water. Universities recognized this and sought him out. The University of Pennsylvania called him to the presidency. Two theological seminaries wanted him as dean. But it was Harvard that really claimed him. He had graduated there, and while yet a very young minister in Philadelphia he had been invited to say the prayer at a service in Cambridge in commemoration of Harvard men who had lost their lives in the Civil War. From that day onward he was Harvard's man. After he became Rector of Trinity Church, Boston, he was elected to the Board of Overseers of Harvard, entered deeply into the religious life of the university, preaching frequently in the college chapel, and in 1881 was called to be Preacher to the University and Professor of Christian Ethics. This opportunity appealed to him greatly; the life of a scholar had always tugged at him and he was terribly tempted to accept. But in the end it was the attraction of the parish ministry which triumphed, narrowly. "It was the quietest death of the pretty little project that you can conceive of, and the pretty little project never looked so pretty as it does now in death", he wrote to a friend. So much a part of Harvard was he that it was altogether fitting after the crowded funeral service in Trinity Church, and another in the great square outside, which was thronged with people, that the procession moved across the bridge to Cambridge, and as they came to the University Harvard men lifted the coffin to their shoulders and carried it through streets lined with students, while the chapel bell, which had often summoned them to hear him preach, tolled his death. So Harvard paid its last tribute.

His literary style was lucid, poetic, full of vivid imagery. His mind, working through the various phases of the subject in hand, was like a diamond turning in the sunlight, each facet flashing its own brilliant colour. He had an amazing ability of expressing the most profound truth in the simplest language. Indeed, profundity and simplicity, depth and reality, were basic qualities in his preaching. He would use the same sermon for the most varied audiences. What he

had said at Trinity in the morning he would repeat that evening to a great gathering of trades union men or in the poorest church in the diocese or at a service in a state prison. For he was easily understood of the people. He had the power of speaking straight to men's souls, cultured or untutored, and evoking what was best and deepest there: deep speaking unto deep.

But it is only as we turn to the spiritual side of Phillips Brooks' nature that we begin to touch bottom. Here was the core and source of his power as preacher: power was not in him, but through him, as the tide pulls the great ocean into bays and inlets. This primarily is what people perceived in him, the basic impression which he made on them. A questionnaire on religion received by William James contained the question: What do you mean by "spirituality" and how would you describe a typical spiritual person? And James answered in two words: "Phillips Brooks." He was a saturated man, filled with the spirit of the Lord Christ. His volume on *The Influence of Jesus*, a book largely forgotten to-day but which has been a kind of lodestar to many men, is in a real sense autobiography. Here was his secret: he was a lover of Jesus Christ and of men, and he tried to bring the two together in a common experience. His mother's constant refrain had been: "Keep close to Christ, Philly; keep very near to your Saviour."

This cardinal quality is what people caught in Brooks, from the early years of his ministry to the day of his death. They sensed that here was one who had "been there", as Plotinus would say: one who knew God "other than by hearsay"; God was speaking through this man, and his listeners were conscious of it.

It is a great tradition here in America, this memory of the life and preaching of Phillips Brooks.

WILLIAM SCARLETT, BISHOP.

The Problem of Sexual Inversion

MR GRAHAM DOWELL'S letter in the January issue of THEOLOGY has directed attention to an important and urgent problem, with which we are as yet inadequately equipped to deal. Theologically, inversion is only one of many aspects of sexual relation, normal and abnormal, which demand a reconsideration of some of our basic assumptions about sex; scientifically, we are far from understanding the real cause and nature of homosexuality; historically, there is often a serious lack of discrimination in attempting to assess the significance of such evidence as we possess. It is manifestly impossible, therefore, to deal summarily with the many questions raised by Mr Dowell, but they afford an opportunity to open a long overdue discussion of the whole subject of sexual inversion.

We must be clear, in the first place, about what we mean by "homosexuality". Owing, perhaps, to the discrimination in the British and other legal systems by which men, and not women, are penalized, it is commonly thought of as a male phenomenon, though it is equally prevalent among females. This fact alone makes some revision of the

law imperative in the interests of equity. But there is no little confusion about male homosexuality. We must distinguish between homosexuals themselves, if we are to do justice to the problem with which they confront us. The Kinsey Report, for instance, claims that 37 per cent of the American male population "has some homosexual experience between the beginning of adolescence and old age".[1] This, if it is true, does not mean that one-third of the American male population is homosexual; in fact, it tells us comparatively little about the real problem. "Homosexuals" can be divided into those who are, so to speak, "natural" inverts, and those who have acquired a homosexual character or who have become addicted to homosexual practices. The latter class can also be subdivided: there are men, sometimes called "bisexuals", who are indiscriminately heterosexual and homosexual by inclination; there are others who have become inverted through perversion; while some are simply depraved individuals who for some reason have temporarily chosen a life of prostitution. Others, again, are heterosexuals who seek homosexual experience from motives of curiosity, or who are driven to it by abnormal conditions of life—active military service or detention in prison; and there are always a few who have become satiated by licentious heterosexual intercourse, and seek new "thrills" in homosexual practices.

These divisions are only rough, and are not exhaustive, but they serve to indicate the complexity of the social, legal, and pastoral problem set by what is generally known as "homosexuality". Obviously the same moral judgment cannot indiscriminately be passed upon all forms of inversion, and it seems clear that while some are, as it were, responsible for their condition (though in differing degrees) others are not. Both classes of homosexual, therefore, cannot fairly be treated as in all essential respects identical, either by the theologian or by the legislator and the sociologist; the "natural" invert must be considered as a type apart, and it is at this point that the Christian conscience must assert itself.

What are we to say about the "natural" invert—the homosexual who cannot help, and did not choose, his condition? At the outset, we are impeded by our ignorance of the cause of inversion; there is no agreement as to whether it is due to some abnormality connected with the ductless glands, or to something psychological, such as a "mother-fixation", nor do we know whether it is, or can be, hereditary. This uncertainty not only renders it more difficult to discover whether there may be means of rectifying the inversion; it also complicates the problem of the theologian and the moralist. If innate homosexuality were found to be biological in origin, it might be ascribed to a warping of the natural order consequent upon the Fall, which produced this and other specific abnormalities. But such a speculation begs the whole question of an historical Fall, and might prove for many reasons to be an entirely insufficient foundation for a theological theory of sexual deviation.

Happily, the aetiology of inversion is quite distinct from the

[1] *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male*, p. 623.

moral, pastoral, and social considerations involved in "natural" homosexuality. It is clear that the innate invert ought not to be penalized on account of his condition. But this is not quite the point at issue; it is not the invert's condition, but the specific sexual expression which his condition demands, that renders him liable to the penalty of the law. This, at least, is clear—society must demand of the invert the same restraint and responsibility in sexual matters as it demands of the heterosexual. From neither, very properly, will the law tolerate sexual offences committed with or against those under the age of consent; from neither will it allow anything coming within the category of personal assault; in both, it will punish nuisance and public indecency. There is no discrimination against the homosexual here. But the British law goes further, and in its intrusion into the privacy of the invert's sexual life is not only grossly unfair, but itself conduces to crime. It is, without doubt, a Christian duty to press for the removal of this anomalous and shameful injustice, which has done untold harm and has achieved no good whatever, and it is to be hoped that those who look to the Church for a lead in this matter will not be disappointed.

But revision of the penal code brings us little nearer a solution of the personal problem of the homosexual who is such by nature. This, I think, takes us to the heart of one of Mr Dowell's questions: Is any relation comparable to marriage permissible to the invert? The invert, like the heterosexual, needs and instinctively seeks personal fulfilment in sexual relation—though not necessarily by means of sexual *acts*: ought this tendency to receive recognition by the community? There are many objections to such a proposal. Marriage is so unique a social institution, and is rooted in a personal relation of so unique a character—the "one flesh" *henosis*—that it is incapable of imitation; to recognize an outwardly and superficially comparable homosexual "union" would create innumerable difficulties. It would obviously necessitate an alteration in the whole structure of society. Nor is there any guarantee that it would achieve the invert's objects; indeed, an invert's own warning in this connexion should be pondered and laid to heart.[1] Moreover, little would be gained by such an institution that a deep and lasting friendship could not secure, and many things might be endangered.

If there are objections to the institutionalizing of homosexual unions in any form comparable to marriage, may the invert not be allowed to establish such sexual relations as he can with one to whom he is attracted, and who will respond to him—and may they not engage in specific sexual acts for their own relief and satisfaction? This, too, is a question of great importance; only by homosexual acts can the invert give physical expression to his sexual impulses—yet such acts are commonly regarded as indecent and unnatural. One thing needs to be borne in mind in this connexion: the genuine invert, especially if he is a man of character and principle, does not

[1] See *The Invert*, by "Anomaly" (London, 1927), pp. 98 ff. This book contains a wise and sane discussion of the problem of the homosexual's adjustments, and should not be neglected in any study of the subject.

always or necessarily incline to practices associated in the minds of most people with homosexual perversion. It is a mistake to assume that homosexual acts must take certain forms. But it is not, in my view, sufficient to consider such acts in themselves; the invert claims that they are, for him, equivalent to sexual intercourse between man and woman. Those who hold that generation is the sole or the primary end of coition will not be able to admit any parallel between homosexual and heterosexual intercourse, but there are many who consider that the latter plays a very important part in the establishment, maintenance, and enrichment of a sexual relation; do not their arguments serve also to justify the intercourse of the invert?

The answer to this question must, I think, be sought in the nature and meaning of sexual differentiation itself. The genuine invert is not simply a woman disguised as a man; he is a man whose sexual desire is oriented towards other men, although in certain other respects he is unquestionably masculine. He is unaffected by the potentiality for maternity which radically conditions the nature of every normal adult woman. Moreover, we have no proof whatsoever that the invert is as basically different from, and therefore complementary to, the normal man, as we know woman to be. Consequently, there is no evidence that any kind of homosexual *henosis* is possible, in which sexual intercourse could possess the significance which it has when it occurs between man and woman—especially when it is remembered that their intercourse is itself meaningless outside the context of a common life of full personal commitment in marriage. While gladly recognizing that a genuine homosexual love may have elements of beauty and altruism, there seems no reason to believe that homosexual intercourse has any quality which makes it strictly comparable to the intercourse of husband and wife. Rather, even at its highest, it would seem to be only an elevated form of self-relief (and perhaps, self-expression) which, although it involves a strong personal affection, is wholly different *in kind* from heterosexual intercourse. Until a deeper knowledge of the nature of inversion than we have at present points to the contrary, we must, with all kindness, insist that homosexual and heterosexual intercourse are in no respect comparable, and that the former cannot be justified on account of the latter. Further, it must be remembered that the invert is often attracted, not to another invert, but to a normal man; in such a case any sexual acts between them, however gratifying, cannot but be regarded as abnormal and unnatural from the standpoint of the heterosexual partner. Thus an assessment of homosexual intercourse in terms of the basic significance of sexual differentiation and union at the same time establishes the case against it, without any necessity for passing judgment upon this or that specific sexual act.[1]

[1] On the whole question of homosexual intercourse, see also H. Northcote, *Christianity and Sex Problems* (Philadelphia, 1916), pp. 290 ff.—though I cannot agree entirely with his view, especially when he insists that removal of the legal ban on homosexual acts would logically necessitate legal recognition and regulation of abnormal unions.

I am aware, of course, that homosexual intercourse is usually condemned on other and more obvious grounds than the foregoing, but most of them seem to me neither to go to the root of the problem nor to be fair enough to the invert. To assume that, because of his condition, he must be guilty of sodomy and "unnatural vice", and to punish him for his sexual acts, is neither just nor conducive to a solution of his difficulties. Certainly homosexual intercourse is denounced in Scripture, but it may fairly be assumed that none of the relevant passages refer to genuine inversion, or take into account the psychological and pathological aspects of homosexuality, as we are now aware of them. Lev. 18. 22 and 20. 13 ignore female homosexuality, and probably allude to perversion—possibly practised for pagan religious purposes. Rom. 1. 27 and 1 Cor. 6. 9 appear to relate to the gross perversions with which we are made familiar in contemporary writings; those condemned in the former passage are men who *forsook* "the natural use"—a phrase which could never be accurately used of the genuine invert.[1] Hence it is necessary, as already emphasized, to distinguish between different kinds of homosexuality. I have ventured upon these few reflections on the genuine invert and his problem, since it was to him that Mr Dowell's letter directed attention; homosexual vice, like heterosexual prostitution and fornication, raises different questions for the theologian, the moralist, and the legislator.

To press for reform of the civil law in regard to homosexual practices does not imply any encouragement of licence or condonation of moral offences. Apart from the removal of a grave injustice, it is bound to mean, in Mr Dowell's words, the admission of "light and fresh air" into the whole problem of inversion—and nothing is more urgently needed. Until the subject of homosexuality is thrown open to free discussion, we are likely to remain in the dark concerning many features of genuine inversion which might help our moral and theological judgments. As I have pointed out, we know all too little about the true invert's condition, and the present conspiracy of silence is valueless both to the invert and to those who would understand and help him. We want the genuine homosexual to come out into the open, confident that he will receive sympathy and guidance from the Church, and a fair deal from the law of the land. So long as the present conditions obtain, he will, in most cases, be unlikely to seek the aid of the pastor and the psychiatrist until it is too late to do much for him, or until he is compelled to do so in circumstances which will militate against the possibility of a return to normality.

Moreover, to throw open the question of inversion would facilitate distinction between the genuine invert and the pervert. In their dealings with the former, normal men might become at once more sympathetic and better able to give tactful and positive assistance, while women, understanding his condition, might give a friendship which

[1] Dr C. H. Dodd sees in the Romans passage a reference to what he calls, either designedly, or due to loose terminology, "homosexual *perversion*", see *The Epistle of Paul to the Romans* (Moffatt Commentary, London, 1941), p. 28 (my italics).

could be of the utmost value if they knew its limitations. Too much could not be hoped, either from legal reform or from a change in the attitude of society; the invert would still be faced with all the difficulties of adjustment, and all the love and skill of the pastor would be needed. But in a society no longer hostile or contemptuous he would find it easier to accept his condition and to make positive use of his gifts; he would be better disposed to benefit by psychiatric treatment, and his progress towards normality (if that were possible) would be facilitated; and his backslidings would not arouse general execration and ostracism. This is indeed a problem which demands the attention of the informed Christian conscience.

SHERWIN BAILEY.

The Sacraments and Eschatology

WE in this country, as compared with the Continent, have given far too little attention to the basic eschatological tension in which the New Testament describes the Church in terms of "new creation", "election", "justification", etc. There is a real difference between eschatological fulfilment and temporal continuity. Most of our description has rested in two dimensions, such as "spirit and matter", "soul and body", whereas we need to grasp a third dimension, that of "time and eternity". We have been describing things, as it were, on a level plain instead of in three-dimensional terms. At the depth of "time and eternity" many problems take on a new shape and become easier of solution without compromise. A particular example may be stated with regard to the question of continuity in the Church and what makes continuity. The order often advanced by Catholics—Christ, the Church, the faithful individual—may be just as wrong as the opposite order—Christ, the faithful individual, the Church—because such temporal sequence, one way or another, infringes upon the eschatological wholeness of the Church. Similarly with the question of faith and baptism. We shall certainly have to grapple with the eschatological atmosphere in which Christianity arose and in which the Scriptures were produced.

On the Continent much work has been done and is being done in this field by Bultmann, Cullman,[1] Marcus Barth, Karl Heim, Althaus, Karl Barth,[2] and Emil Brunner.[3] In the main the "realized eschatology" of Professor C. H. Dodd, with which we have become familiar, is replaced by "propletic eschatology" in which the futurist element is retained alongside the realized element. The main lines of this work can be briefly described. Time is the characteristic form of life, including the life of God. There are, (1) original uncreated time, and (2) created time. So far as "uncreated time" in concerned, it is the time of God in which God lives his life, it is the perfection of the Kingdom of God, and past, present and future are in one

[1] *Christ and Time.*
[2] See Part II, Vol. III of Barth's *Dogmatik.*
[3] See his King's College Lectures.

another, not before and after one another as in "created time".[1] Created time is granted to man as the form in which he lives his life, so that the world is a realm of free divine activity and a gift of the Creator. In this time every act has its moment and acts cohere in duration. Measured limits are appointed, beginning, duration, and end. Thus created time is, (1) time which is given, (2) time which is appointed, (3) time which begins, and (4) time which ends. For complete understanding of Christian eschatology the Man Jesus in his time is the point of departure. The New Testament shows him as the Lord "which *is* and which *was* and which *is to come*",[2] as the Lord of time. The time of Jesus is the "time of God" with us. We may contrast his time and our time, in which he lived his incarnate life. For us (1) time begins, so from the point of view of an earlier time it does not yet exist; (2) our time continues and from the contemporary standpoint is limited to that duration; (3) our time ends, so from the point of view of later time it no longer exists. But the Man Jesus is not thus limited: (1) the Man Jesus will be in that he is and was; (2) he is in that he will be and was; (3) he was in that he is and will be. Thus he lives in the life-time which he needs, as we all do; but he lives the life of one who represents God to man and man to God, the life of the judge who establishes God's righteousness before man, and man's righteousness before God and before his fellow-men. Therefore, the life which he lives as man is not his exclusively: it is the life of God, who is the Lord of time, both "created time" and "God's time". The time in which he lives this life is not only his time, but the time of God's life and of man's. It is the time which always was whenever men have lived, which always is where men now live, and which always will be whenever men shall live. All men become his contemporaries, though in different fashion as between (1) those who lived before c. 7 B.C.; (2) those who lived c. 7 B.C. to A.D. 30—i.e. during the Incarnation: and (3) those who live after c. A.D. 30. All become his contemporaries through the power of the Holy Spirit and solely through this activity in periods 1 and 2, but again differently in period 1 from period 2. In period 1 the Holy Spirit points in *anticipation* to the Incarnation: in period 2 by *re-*

[1] See the revealing study of "time" (*'eth*) as understood by the Hebrews in H. Wheeler Robinson's book, *Inspiration and Revelation* (Oxford University Press), pp. 109 *et seq.*; his study of "eternity" (*'olam*), pp. 113 *et seq.*; and his study of the inter-relation of time and eternity, pp. 116 *et seq.* In these studies he shows the sharp contrast between the Hebrew and Greek ideas of time and eternity. He shows (1) that God is intimately connected with time, and that his relation to men itself requires the time-order for the fulfilment of his purposes. Time, as the necessary quality of these purposes, acquires a specific quality by its very relation to God when man's time becomes God's time; (2) time and eternity stand in close relation, not in any sharp contrast; eternity implies remoteness of time; (3) this inter-relation is of particular importance for the eschatology in which history finds its consummation, since this is timeless in content, though compelled to use a time vocabulary. (Timeless in the sense of "created time"—W.R.). In an appendix he contrasts with this the time-consciousness of Ecclesiastes, which he says is un-Hebraic. See also his study of the category of "actuality" in *Redemption and Revelation*, pp. xxvi *et seq.*

[2] Rev. 1. 4. See also John 1. 1; 8. 58.

CHURCH DIVINITY SCHOOL OF THE PACIFIC

flection, though both "anticipation" and "reflection" are here being used in the Hebrew sense to signify "actuality".[1] In any case, whenever we mention eschatology we point to the Holy Spirit. This means that to be in time is to be in relation through Christ with God's eternity.

This, briefly, is how the matter is being looked at by Continental scholars, and it raises two problems, both closely related to the sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist: (1) the problem of the beginning, being in Christ, and (2) the problem of the end, death and resurrection and their allied problems.

Baptism

The Gospels make it perfectly clear that Christianity began as a movement which represented a new beginning in the life of Israel, the prelude to the coming of the messianic kingdom. It demanded a baptism of repentance for the remission of sins[2] and even declared that fleshly descent from Abraham was irrelevant.[3] It was saturated with eschatological notions. It announced that the coming Messiah would baptize with the Holy Spirit and with fire.[4] But this did not eventually mean that the Christian Church when it came did away with the visible sign of baptism in water, as we see from the practice of the Church in the Acts of the Apostles.[5] The baptism of our Lord by John must have had a profound effect on the life of the Church.[6] It is clear that there was no entrance into the Church apart from baptism. The Church was the new eschatological community and was entered by baptism alike by both Jews and Gentiles. The whole act can be described as "being born of water and the Spirit"[7] or as "the laver of regeneration and the renewing of the Holy Spirit".[8] What really seals the kingdom as having been now founded and eschatologically realized consists of *both* the baptism of our Lord and his death, resurrection, and exaltation. At our Lord's baptism the kingdom—the righteousness of God—is ushered in.[9] He is endowed in full measure with the Holy Spirit and declared to be Messiah. Jesus in his baptism begins to fulfil the righteousness of God: there is a new creation. In his death and resurrection he gains the victory over the forces opposed to the kingdom, and this victory will be made plain at his coming again.

So in the New Testament the two figures used to describe baptism

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[1] See footnotes 1 on page 53 and 3 on page 57. [2] Matt. 3. 2; Luke 3. 3.
[3] Matt. 3. 9; Luke 3. 8. [4] Matt. 3. 11; Luke 3. 16.
[5] The Fourth Gospel carries the practice back into the life of Jesus. See John 3. 22; 4. 1, 2.
[6] Sufficient allowance has not been made for this, especially in the Western Church. In the Eastern Church the Feast of Epiphany represents, not the showing of Jesus to the wise men, but the Baptism of Jesus, and is as important as Christmas, if not more important. [7] John 3. 5. [8] Titus 3. 5.
[9] Matt. 3. 15. Sufficient attention has not been paid to the force of the words "it becometh us to fulfil all righteousness" in close connexion with our Lord's baptism.

are "new birth" or "new creation" and "dying and rising again". These acts which in Jesus were the acts of God in history—God's time penetrating into our time—were eschatologically repeated in the believer at his baptism. The Christian henceforth lived in two times—our time and God's time. When baptism in the New Testament is described as "new birth" or as "death, burial, and resurrection", all is in the realm of *action*, but it is *dynamic* and not *static* action such as the signing of a deed or contract. It is "once-for-all" action and "continuing" action, and is always action *in Christ*. The action which took place in Christ's life was not *circumstantial* action, but action due entirely to the will of God. In the birth, baptism, life, death, resurrection, and exaltation of Jesus, God had acted; and he was acting now in the life of the Church and would continue to act until our Lord's coming again. Our Lord's birth in Bethlehem was a "once-for-all" act, yet he was "begotten before all worlds". His baptism in Jordan was a "once-for-all" act, fulfilling all righteousness and declaring him to be the Son of God, yet there never was a time when he had not been the Son of God and fulfilled his righteousness. His death on Calvary was a "once-for-all" act, yet he was "slain from the foundation of the world".[1] These acts—"once-for-all", yet eternal—had constituted the "new creation" and redeemed the world. In baptism this was sealed for each believer and dramatically re-presented. The baptism of the convert—alike with our Lord's birth, baptism, death, and resurrection—was *his* work performed by him, not *our* work. From the point of view of our time it is a "once-for-all" act, and the mind of the Church was right in declaring the repetition of baptism to be sacrilegious. It represents the *beginning* which can have no repetition. But is not only in "man's time"; it is also in "God's time" and is eternal and cannot be eradicated.

It is a dying and rising again, but it is his death and resurrection as well as ours—we die, are buried and rise again *with* him: it is co-experiencing. In our baptism we are eschatologically back at Jordan and back at Calvary and the empty tomb. It is the "first death" and "first resurrection" implied and spoken of in the Apocalypse,[2] and over those who pass through it the "second death" has no power. In baptism we join ourselves to our Lord in his redeeming acts; but what is more important is that he joins himself to us. Baptism is not only action *by* us, but action *on* us—something objective to which we offer the subjective response. From the waters of baptism a new self emerges—we "put off" and "put on", and this is ratified in heaven and must be ratified in our lives here on earth. From this moment we live in two worlds, not one, this world and the world to come, and by the power of the eternal world we overcome this world. Already "we taste of the powers of the age to come".[3] But the end is not yet: we are between the times. We await his coming and we must be faithful as he is faithful.

[1] Rev. 13. 8.

[2] Rev. 2. 11; 20. 5, 6, 14; 21. 8. See an article on "The 'first resurrection' and the 'second death' in the Apocalypse", which I contributed to THEOLOGY, Vol. XLVI, No. 275, pp. 97–102.

[3] Heb. 6. 5.

The Eucharist

In apostolic times the sole purpose of the Church's meeting on the Lord's Day was "to break bread", to "show the Lord's death".[1] This is plain in the New Testament and needs no arguing to-day. Till towards the close of the second century there is no evidence that the Church knew any other form of *public corporate* worship.[2] It was the Church's offering of herself as the Body of Christ, but offering in Christ. It was, therefore, priestly and sacrificial worship, though of a different order of sacrificial worship from that offered in Jewish and heathen temples,[3] as his sacrifice had been something altogether new in that it was a *willing* sacrifice in which the priest and victim were one. A hint at the pattern of this corporate worship is seen in Acts 2. 42—the Apostles' teaching, the fellowship, the breaking of the bread, and the prayers; but we await the first complete account of it until Justin Martyr's recital of the Sunday Eucharist in his first Apology.[4] This account differs significantly from Western medieval individualist ideas of Holy Communion and is much more akin to the corporate and sacrificial conceptions of the Eastern Churches to which the West in our day is looking more and more.

The institution of the Lord's Supper at the Last Supper is placed in the setting of his own death and self-offering. The eschatological character is secured in all the Gospel accounts by some such phrase as "until I drink it new with you in the Kingdom of Heaven". It is secured in St Paul by the words "until he come".[5] It has Passover,[6] Covenant[7] and eschatological significance. In the Apocalypse the eschatological character is given by reference to the Lamb's bridal feast.[8] Again, we must understand that those who are admitted to this feast live in two worlds. Eschatologically the "once-for-all" death and resurrection of Christ are repeated. It was the mistake of the Latin mind, which had little understanding of eschatological matters, that led to the notion that they were *temporally* repeated; but they are eschatologically repeated. The Roman Catholic understanding of the sacrifice of the Mass is based upon this truth and this error. It is true that eschatologically in this sacrament "Christ is visibly depicted crucified before our eyes".[9] We do not offer him. He offers himself anew for us at each Eucharist; and we, his body, the Church, offer ourselves to him as we spiritually feed upon his sacrifice, receiving his body and blood. Eschatologically this is better described in terms

[1] Acts. 20. 7; 1 Cor. 11. 17–34.

[2] Of course Christians, like Jews, prayed three times a day, but there is no evidence that this was *public corporate* worship. The earliest corporate services of which we have record are the Vigils and especially the Easter Vigil, but these were in close connexion with the Eucharist. See Tertullian, *Ad Uxor*, II. 4. Hippolytus about the same time mentions occasional meetings for instruction and preaching accompanied with prayer. *The Apostolic Tradition*, Easton's translation, Part IV, pp. 35, 36.

[3] 1. Cor 10.

[4] *Ante-Nicene Christian Library*, Vol. II, pp. 64–6.

[5] 1 Cor. 11. 26.

[6] 1 Cor. 5. 7.

[7] Matt. 26. 28; Mark 14. 24; Luke 22. 20.

[8] Rev. 3. 20; 19. 9, 17; 21. 9.

[9] Gal. 3. 1.

of "Real Action", rather than in terms of "Real Presence", the former referring to the category of *time* and the latter to that of *space,* and rather suggesting theosophical atmosphere over against moral. What happens is something *personal* and *ethical* rather than purely *metaphysical.*

Following Dom Gregory Dix,[1] I would suggest that this all appears in the word *anamnesis,* which unfortunately has become translated in our English Bible as "in memory of", as if the Lord's Supper were merely a convenient symbol and nothing more—a kind of memory-quickener. The sentence *touto poieite eis tēn emēn anamnēsin*[2] is capable of another translation than that of "this do in memory of me": "Do this for my re-calling", where "re-calling" has the sense of actually bringing back.[3] As in the time process Jesus could actually give his Body and Blood to the disciples *before* they had been offered on Calvary, so in the same process he can actually give the same Body and Blood *after* they have been offered. In St Paul this is carried still further, for he claims that the Israelites "did all eat the same spiritual meat, and did all drink the same spiritual drink".[4] This is not allegory, as has often been supposed: it is an *arrhabōn.*[5] Our Lord's sacrifice, which in the time process is "once-for-all" and never repeated, is eternal, stretching before and after; and so St Paul can say "as oft as ye do this ye do show the Lord's death till he come".[6] The word *katangellō* (translated "show" in the A.V. and "proclaim" in the R.V.) is the word so often used in the New Testament for the *kērugma,* which centred in the sacrifice of Christ upon the Cross. Calvin, following St Augustine, was truly justified in claiming that the Lord's Supper was a *verbum visibile,* as preaching was a *verbum audibile,* but he missed the eschatological significance of this. The eschatological understanding is that when the sacrament is celebrated by the Church Christ truly becomes our contemporary.

Thus, at the Eucharist "the priestly Church offers worship through her great High Priest, who is here set forth in his holy redeeming act as *sacrificium.* Upon this sacrifice the Church spiritually feeds in Communion (fellowship), which is God's *giving* and our *receiving,* something essentially personal",[7] and for that reason more real than if it were something *theosophical.* "It is that which has divine char-

[1] See *The Shape of the Liturgy.* [2] Luke 22. 19.

[3] See, for example, the interesting and revealing discussion of the Hebrew word *zākhar* (to remember) in Johs Pedersen's *Israel,* I and II, pp. 106 *et seq.,* where he says of the Hebrews, "When the soul remembers something, it does not mean that it has an objective image of some thing or event, but that the image is called forth in the soul and assists in determining its direction, its action." Here he is stressing H. Wheeler Robinson's category of "actuality". See footnote 1, p. 53. [4] 1 Cor. 10. 3, 4.

[5] Cf. Heb. 11. The argument is not allegorical as with Philo and the Stoics. It is eschatological and is better expressed by coining the word *arrhabōnical* (see 2 Cor. 1. 22; 5. 5; Eph. 1. 14). The difference is in the ontological character of the event, in its "actuality". In pure allegory it has no ontological character, but only an allusive character. Here it is intended that the faith of the Israelites was real faith in Christ, even though historically speaking Christ had not yet appeared. Eschatologically speaking he had appeared.

[6] 1 Cor. 11. 26. [7] *The Ministry and Sacraments* (Ed. Dunkerley), p. 264.

acter which is being done, that which has significance for eternal reality".[1] Not only is that which in the time series was done in the upper room and completed on the Cross being done; but *arrhabōnically* the Lamb's bridal feast is being celebrated. "Whilst faith is necessary for obedience in any true personal relationship (an emphasis which is weakened where *legal* and *metaphysical* conceptions have been substituted for *personal* conceptions), yet the value of what is being done is not dependent upon anything so fluctuating as our experience of Christ. Neither is it to be measured by 'spiritual uplift' in us, a kind of feeling register. Where this is emphasized to the exclusion of precision in the rite, or to the exclusion of the rite altogether and the substitution of some other rite, however good the intention, the result is to rob the action of that objectivity which is the guarantee of its being other than the action of man. To mutilate the act in what is essential to its character as a dramatic setting forth of God's holy love in action, as revealed in Christ Jesus our Lord, for the purpose of increasing tone or effect or for any other subjective purpose, is to set our preferences against his holy will."[2]

What I have said about the Eucharist can perhaps best be summed up in a hymn written in the early days of the last World War whilst travelling by bus in the "black-out" between Kidderminster and Birmingham:[3]

Thee we praise, High Priest and Victim,
Of our hearts the Shepherd King;
Living, dying, rising, saving:
Now let alleluyas ring.

Here as priests before thine altar
We are met to worship thee;
All thy saints in earth, in heaven,
Humbly bend th' adoring knee.

Here we see the mystery telling
Of thy wondrous love for men;
Here set forth in sacred symbol
Love beyond our widest ken.

See thy Body bruised and broken,
See thy Blood for us outpoured;
Thou the priest and thou the victim:
Holy, holy, holy Lord.

Now thou standest at thine altar
Feeding us with food divine;
Here thy Flesh and Blood thou givest,
Making us most truly thine.

[1] *Ministry and Sacraments*, p. 264. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 264, 265.
[3] This hymn in part is now included in the new *Congregational Hymnary*.

Lo! in adoration bending,
We receive what thou dost give;
Join the angels' song unending,
Feed by faith on thee and live.

Praise to thee, eternal Saviour,
Praises from the earth ascend,
Praises from the saints in heaven,
Alleluyas without end.

W. Robinson.

The Philosophy of M. Gabriel Marcel

In France M. Gabriel Marcel enjoys an established reputation. As a dramatist—and he has published some fifteen plays—his work is not the least distinguished contribution to the distinction of the contemporary French theatre. As a philosopher—although the nature of his thinking renders any other than a formal distinction between these roles illegitimate—he is known as a leading exponent of "existentialism" in its Christian form. However, although his name is not unfamiliar in this country and certain of his philosophical writings are available in English—to the number of which the first volume of his Gifford Lectures now makes a notable addition[1]—there is among us as yet, so far as one is able to judge, no Christian existentialist group or even any one original thinker who has come markedly within the orbit of existentialist influence, notwithstanding that intensive study of Kierkegaard to which innumerable invocations of his name may or may not bear witness. A main reason, I suspect, for our apparent lack of response to M. Marcel's type of thought is a certain difficulty in following his method. It is not the method which we associate with philosophical inquiry. And it has to be said that at any rate this new volume will on the face of it do little to ease the difficulty. M. Marcel, it would seem here, is more psychologist than philosopher. His reflections upon the self, upon the situation of the self in relation to others and upon what he calls "the mystery of being" generally, presented always *in concreto,* recalls—though I would suggest no further comparison—the celebrated lectures of William James a half-century ago. But M. Marcel's approach, if it will not readily engage the sympathy of the academic philosopher, has an originality and an intrinsic interest which merit serious attention. Moreover, Marcel is not a "freak" thinker. Apart from tendencies which, as an existentialist, he shares with Karl Jaspers—as also with Heidegger and Sartre (and chronologically, I would point out, many of his views are an anticipation and not a reflection of theirs)—his whole line of thought has obvious affinity with the tradition of French "personalism" and "activism" to be traced back through Laberthonnière and Lachelier to Maine de Biran.

[1] *The Mystery of Being,* Part I: Reflection and Mystery (Harvill Press, 15s.).

M. Marcel did not derive the primal inspiration of his teaching from Kierkegaard. Indeed, he had reached a similar position before ever having read a word of the Danish thinker. Rather did it come—it was so with Kierkegaard himself—as a direct reaction from the idealism in which he had been schooled. Even as a student he found the spirit and method of Hegel and the neo-Hegelians uncongenial. "As against absolute Knowledge he rediscovered the meaning of love, of participation, of subjectivity."[1]

Like all adherents of the existentialist creed, he is vividly conscious of the division, stress, and failure in the world of our time. Anguish is the emotional substratum of his mind. Life, on the face of it, is an absurdity. "The fact," he adds, "that it can appear to me as literally devoid of meaning is an integral part of its structure."[2] "Despair is a central datum for metaphysics."[3] The arguments for suicide, he considers, are in themselves irrefutable. To be or not to be is our utterly free choice. But the sum of his teaching, far from issuing in black pessimism, is confident and hopeful. *L'ésperance est peut-être l'étoffe même dont notre âme est faite.* Hope, he says, is to the soul what breathing is to the body. Where it is lacking the soul dries up and expires.

It is accurately said of him that he is one of those thinkers "for whom philosophical speculation has no other source than their own inner experience and persists only by means of continuous reference to it".[4] For, with Kierkegaard, Marcel would hold that truth is in subjectivity. "The more I accentuate the objectivity of things by cutting the umbilical cord which binds them to my existence . . . the more I affirm the independence of this world in regard to myself—its radical indifference to my fate, to my particular ends—the more does this same world, which alone is proclaimed to be real, turn itself into a spectacle felt as illusory, an immense documentary film offered to my curiosity which yet, in the end, destroys itself because it ignores *me*."[5] It is in accord with this attitude that Marcel should prove himself an unsystematic thinker. His *Journal métaphysique,* begun in 1914, was intended for the accumulation of material for a volume which would contain a system. But, as he has told us, he feels now that this work will never be written.[6] The Gifford Lectures are evidently not to be regarded as an attempted fulfilment of this original ambition. The fact is of course that M. Marcel repudiates the very notion of a "systematic" philosophy. Speculative systems rest on abstract principles and proceed by rational argumentation. But reality, as distinct from the world of concepts, is not to be apprehended by such means.

On the contrary, the truth of ideas is to be judged not by the extent to which they can be shown to fit into a carefully articulated system but by the authenticity of the experience whence they derive. Marcel's doctrine is to be understood as having been distilled, so to

[1] Roger Troisfontaines, *Existentialisme et Pensée chrétienne* (2me éd., 1948), p. 32. [2] *Etre et avoir,* p. 132. [3] *Ibid.,* p. 150.
[4] E. Gilson, in *Existentialisme chrétien* (Plon, 1947), p. 1.
[5] *Du refus à l'invocation,* p. 32. [6] *Homo Viator,* p. 5.

say, from the flow of his personal being—his thought and feelings, his most vital and intimate reactions to his own life-situation. In his early years he had no religious belief, had never indeed been taught one in childhood. What first struck him was the existential fact of the Christian faith as an operative power in the lives of those who sincerely held it; a fact which he could simply not ignore. But although he soon became aware of the appeal which Christianity had come to possess for him he still demanded, as a good rationalist, some objective verification of its truth. It struck him, however, that the conditions of verification in the spiritual world were other than those in the material. In the physical universe those conditions may be controlled, in such a way that they remain substantially the same for every observer. Thus the conclusions of a multiplicity of observers are likely to be identical. In the physical sciences objectivity of view is a possibility and for their purposes necessary. But in respect of the spiritual world the conditions of verification cannot be produced at will. Marcel illustrates his argument thus. Suppose, he says, that a friend and I are looking at a landscape and that my friend points out to me on the horizon what he takes to be a mountain. It may be that, endowed with better sight than he, or else simply better informed concerning the topography of the district, I have to tell him that his mountain is only a cloud. But a similar reply is inapplicable to the religious sphere. It seems to me that I can never say to a believer, "Your God is a cloud". In the first instance, assuredly, it is a question of a world which is common to us both. What we are talking about is one and the same thing, in regard to which we occupy positions strictly comparable. In the world of religion, on the other hand, this exchange of position is impossible. I cannot put myself in the place of my friend; and that for a number of reasons, of which the most striking is that *he is not distinguishable from the position he occupies*—he is that position himself. When therefore I say "I believe" I am making a uniquely personal affirmation. In relation to God I stand where no other does or can stand, and to that extent my apprehension of God's being is original.

The distinction, in Marcel's view, between "existential" thinking, which takes account of the personal factor, imponderable and infinitely various, and "objective" thinking, concerned with principles universally recognized, is fundamental. The latter clearly has its uses, and important they are. But it is incapable of sounding the depths of actual human problems. The properly philosophical task, therefore—and here thinkers like Marcel are in open conflict with the main tradition in metaphysics—is not with universal principles but with concrete realities. "I would for my part," he declares, "be inclined to deny the properly philosophical quality to any work in which one fails to detect what I would call the bite of the real."[1] Hence the

[1] *Du refus à l'invocation*, p. 89. The second volume of *The Mystery of Being* has now appeared, but M. Marcel shows us that he is in no way prepared to lessen his adherence to the "concrete" method. "Not only", he says, in his concluding chapter, "do I not allow that it is possible for the philosopher to abstract from a situation which must unhesitatingly be qualified as eschatologi-

attraction for the existentialists—and very notably for the French school—of the forms of imaginative literature.[1]

The ground-fact of human existence is man's *incarnation*, the union of his mental and physical life. My body, says Marcel, is "the nodal point of my concrete situation". From one aspect it appears to be my very ego; from another an instrument, rather, which I may be said to possess and of which I am free to dispose at will. Yet again, extrinsically and objectively considered, my body is no longer mine but one merely among others. Yet for all the intimacy of this union between my "self" and my body I still am not to be identified with my physical being, for in addition and no less obviously, am I a psychical entity and a conscious subject. The nature of "incarnation" must thus be fully understood. It is far more than a mode of relationship between terms conceptually dissociated and contrasted. Incarnation involves bodily appearance without either identification with or distinction from the ego. The living human body, that is to say, is inconceivable apart from the complex psychic life manifested in what we describe as the faculties of the soul; faculties which, in turn, are not evidenced save through the instrumentality of the body and in correlation with the organic functions. To misconceive this essential unity of the psycho-physical life is to mistake the basic character of the concrete human existent.

But my body, as the "nodal point of my concrete situation", is the centre of what Marcel calls my "existential orbit"; in other words, my location in space and time—the places I successively inhabit and the particular nexus of relationships which that location involves. Such in truth is my "world". But, as an "interior resonance" within this personal world, I become aware of the larger, remoter life of the universe itself. The ultimate extent of my relationships, however indirect, is therefore not less than the whole sweep of my existence. I am inextricably "situated"—*au monde*. Now it is at this point that M. Marcel finds himself faced with the fact and problem of existence in its widest and profoundest implications. His inability to accept the world as pure contingence, without origin or purpose—an inability also to accept his own personal existence after the same manner—brought him, in 1929, to Christianity and the Church. The entry in his *Journal*, 23 March of that year, records simply: "I was baptized, this morning, in a condition of mind I scarcely was hoping for: no exaltation, but a feeling of peace, of balance, or hope, of faith."

The world, then, is the creation of God, to whom man must look as to the only source of his being. But God wills to create for the fulfilment of certain ends and purposes which we do not always per-

cal, but I even deny his right to do so", and confesses that he is "at pains to keep clear of abstractions". Himself in a situation of crisis, he cannot avoid this insistent fact when addressing a generation of men who themselves are so situated.

[1] "Si la description de l'essence relève de la philosophie proprement dite, seul le roman permettra d'évoquer dans sa réalité complète, singulière, temporelle, le jaillissement originel de l'existence" (Simone de Beauvoir, "Littérature et métaphysique", in *Temps modernes*, 1 April 1946, p. 1160 f.).

ceive very clearly but which are none the less certain for all that: ends and purposes which are in accord with the best that the human reason and conscience can acclaim. So it is that the believer accepts his situation, and this acceptance is the kind of response to the challenge of being which is properly called religious. Thereafter my existence is not only or primarily "mine", but is consecrated to God, from whom is all existence. "The lover offers to his beloved both the world and himself. In the same way the believer makes of his body and all the vicissitudes of his life an offering and surrender to God."[1] His sorrows and suffering, his efforts, his joy—these wholly are dedicated to him.

But my life is in great part the resultant of my freedom. M. Marcel's thinking is here highly characteristic of the tendencies which he is taken to represent. For Heidegger and Sartre as for Karl Jaspers, "authentic" existence depends upon the power and will to choose freely. Sartre pronounces categorically: *L'essence de l'être humain est en suspens dans la liberté.*[2] Indeed, my situation in time and place—Jaspers' *Dasein*—presents a challenge which compels me to decision. On the one hand I am not merely my situation, absorbed by it, unable to act freely but only to be acted upon in submission to force of circumstances; nor, on the other, can I deny my situation, since all that goes to make up my situation is quite effectively part of *me*. Of first importance, at once as the expression of innate freedom and as the principle of unity and continuity in life, is, Marcel believes, one's *vocation*. This it is which secures, in measure more or less, the integration of one's actions. It is not necessary to interpret the word in its more confined meaning of "profession". It is sufficient that by it is understood a sense of purpose. To this purpose, once admitted, a man should remain loyal.

The idea of "loyalty" or "fidelity", and in connexion therewith that of "presence", is, again, a special feature of Marcel's thought. *Fidélite, présence,* relate to the self, to others, and to God. In the first place, I am *engagé*—the use of the word in post-war France has become a kind of hall-mark for the whole existentialist group—and loyalty to my commitments is that and only that which will deliver me from the vague, interminable series of events and establish me in authentic being. By self-loyalty I shall become what I seek to be. Otherwise I deny myself, I lose authenticity. But self-loyalty has its necessary correlative in commitment to others; and commitment grows to its fullest in love, in the generalized ethical sense as well as in the more restricted context of sex. Love however demands "presence". The third person becomes *thou,* and *I* and *thou* achieve union in *us*.

The meaning of loyalty and presence is abundantly illustrated in regard to the fact of death; for the absence which death seems to impose ceases where love and loyalty are strong. It should be remarked that in Gabriel Marcel's personal experience death has aroused a perhaps unusually insistent and persistent problem. His

[1] Pierre Colin, in *Existentialisme chrétien,* p. 52. [2] *L'être et le néant,* p. 61.

emotional reaction to it has always been acute, as the reader of the *Journal métaphysique* will discover. The problem moreover for him, as for so very many more, was violently reasserted by the World Wars. Delicate health precluded military service in 1914 and so gave him the chance of taking up Red Cross work on behalf of the missing. In dealing with the relatives he eschewed the cold impartiality of officialdom and regardless of effort gave each and every case sympathetic attention. The mere "he"—or "they"—relation gave place in countless concrete instances to the "thou" attitude. Marcel has long meditated the means of transcending the absences of separation and death, and has found that faithfulness and resurgent hope give the answer. "Even when I can neither touch you nor see you I feel that you are with me. I feel myself to be influenced, to be created, by the loved one. Rendered by death more free, he is closer to me."[1] But this is not the whole story. Our loyalty demands something more. We need the conviction that personal survival rests not upon memory alone and the influence which, through memory, may still be exerted on the living. We need to know that the loved one survives as a centre of consciousness, a continuing self, by whom the bond of loyalty which binds the living to the dead is in turn felt. And the only assurance possible of such ontological survival is in the postulate that God exists: a postulate that is not merely an intellectual premise but—and essentially—an act of faith. It is not surprising that with this preoccupation with the question of death M. Marcel should have given considerable attention to psychical research, a study in which at one time, during the first World War, he collaborated with Bergson. Nor has he ever relinquished the view that the phenomena with which psychical research deals are of immediate relevance to philosophical inquiry. But as to the possibilities of establishing a progressive scientific knowledge in this enigmatic field he reserves his judgment. Rather indeed than pursue a road wherefrom one may pass all too easily from "muddled certainty to complete discouragement" it is better to base one's beliefs in personal survival upon the intuitions of faith, aided by divine grace.

Yet our relation to God is not a vague apprehension of a remote and elusive Presence, but a fact less questionable even than our relation to our own ego or to other selves, inasmuch as God, the Being of beings, is the ultimately real. Our aspiration towards him is his own immanent action, to which we respond. To the objection that the impulse and movement of faith is thus "mystical" and not "rational"—terms which the French mind does not easily co-ordinate —Marcel returns the simple reply that it is a question of determining whether, between metaphysics and mysticism, there exists on a final estimate any definable frontier.[2] Moreover, we are not presented, through faith, with an ideal pattern or "type" as the preconceived form of our self-realization. The goal of our moral and spiritual life is not "objectively" known to us until we have attained to it, since

[1] *Positions et approches concrètes du mystère ontologique*, p. 292.
[2] *De refus à l'invocation*, p. 190.

the action of faith is not initially or fundamentally an intellectual persuasion, but an interior and "vital" motion. And because faith is thus a personal affirmation it is never quite the same thing in any two instances. In respect therefore of the perennial issues of faith and reason Marcel is far from the intellectualism which the Thomist revival has established as *de rigueur*. On the contrary, faith is voluntaristically described, as a matter basically of moral disposition, and in manifestation an adherence to a person much more than assent to a dogmatic symbol. In all of which there is a persistent echo of the Modernism of a generation or so ago.

M. Marcel's philosophy, although in its positive conclusions at the opposite pole to M. J.-P. Sartre's, shares with Sartre and his group certain characteristic positions: pre-eminently that man is *au monde*, in a concrete situation which determines the form and measure of his liberty. But however circumscribed one's situation may be this liberty is none the less real and because of it one's inalienable responsibility. The self is inconceivable apart from other selves whose existence is as intuitively certain as is one's own. Unlike Professor Jaspers, whose theism still does not permit him to posit of the Deity any specific attributes, and who would allow also to the individual the widest freedom of interpretation in matters of religion, M. Marcel is a Catholic and so committed to the acceptance of Catholic dogma as an objective system of belief. But with Jaspers he sharply distinguishes from "objective" thinking that "subjectivity" which, conditioned by situation, temperament, and personal disposition, is the only road to the truth. Again, Marcel's opposition to the ego as self-dissipating and self-forsworn and the ego as loyal to itself and its commitments parallels Jaspers' distinction between mere *Dasein* and *Existenz* or Heidegger's between *Dasein* inauthentic and authentic. But of much that is so apparent is the existentialist attitude—the inescapable and desolating sense of the contingence and utter purposelessness of existence, of limitless responsibility in a world to which, paradoxically, moral valuations have no intrinsic relevance, of the vague and morbid *Angst* which such motiveless responsibility awakens in the mind—Marcel's work is free, and his final word is one of hope. It is rather in his drama that this recurrent note of the existentialist mood is more clearly heard. Yet to Kierkegaard's sour humours M. Marcel's nature is foreign. The ultimate confidence of his outlook is a reflection of the genial temper of the man himself.

B. M. G. Reardon.

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The Right Rev. William Scarlett is Bishop of Missouri.

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CORRESPONDENCE

THE MAN-IN-THE-PEW

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

In his review of *The Story of the Christian Church* (Mowbrays, 3s. 6d.), in your issue of December 1951, Mr Barry Till writes: "This excellent little book is one which should find its way into the hands of 'the man-in-the-pew' all over the country; the problem, of course, is to get it there, but that fortunately is not the reviewer's task." May I suggest that this task, though difficult, is not impossible, and that something of value can be achieved in this direction through the installation of a bookcase at the back of the parish church, or at some point where it is likely to be noticed by those entering and leaving?

In the case of the present writer's parish a bookcase of four shelves was made gratis by a skilled local carpenter from a mantelpiece taken from the vicarage, which is undergoing repair. Its introduction and the craftsman's name were mentioned in the parish magazine, so that not only might the bookcase take its place in the fabric of the church, but the whole project find a place in the interest and even affection of the parish—an object which would have been rendered just a few degrees more difficult by the insertion of a ready-made or mass-produced article.

The nucleus of a collection was provided by the present members of the writer's theological college, who generously subscribed some twenty books from their private shelves, together with a much valued donation of one pound. These, and all subsequent accessions and contributions from parishioners—some of them of high value—have been acknowledged in the magazine, and comment made on new books where possible or necessary. I hasten, of course, to mention that the idea is neither my own nor new. I owe any appreciation of its possibilities to a member of your editorial committee.

Its precise value is not easily assessed, but it may be considered under four heads, and doubtless more.

(i) If the work of a priest in the pulpit at the present time is mainly to teach and explain rather than exhort, and if, further, the average congregation is either unable or unwilling to lend its close attention for more than twenty minutes, it is helpful to be able to refer one's hearers to a book in the bookcase in which the point of one's sermon is developed, and still more helpful if some indication can be made of the particular lines along which it is developed.

(ii) Many of one's words possess overtones of meaning wider than the precise context in which they are used in the sermon: hence the more one's congregation is reading, the richer the associations that are likely to surround one's words, just as our own appreciation of the Wisdom literature, for example, deepens as experience of life lengthens.

(iii) The existence of the Body of Christ in a parish does not de-

pend only upon the members' mutual coinherence on the plane of charity, but also upon their mutual awareness and, one may add, enjoyment of the great Christian doctrines. Christian truth is the element in which our minds move and breathe. The point here is that our awareness of this realm of truth and of our dependence for salvation and sanity upon it can be enormously quickened by the presence of a common store of books in which these doctrines may be studied.

(iv) Lastly, relative to this, the quality of common life is considerably enriched, especially in parishes where different brands of churchmanship are in evidence, by the choice and commendation of books which do not necessarily echo the views of the majority. It is a good method of teaching people that we need each other's insights, especially the insights of those who differ from us, if the truth is ever to be seen in its wholeness.

It only remains to add that the books are being read, *The Story of the Christian Church* among them.

Yours sincerely,
J. K. Byrom.

Cheadle Hulme,
Cheshire.

GRAVESTONES

To the Editor of Theology.

Dear Sir,

In return for a Sunday's sermons, I would gladly offer hospitality to any of your correspondents who may care to investigate the effect of John Virido's Agricultural By-product[1] upon (*a*) new stone and (*b*) parochial *koinonia*. I did not, it is true, apply the emulsion with my own ordained hand; but I like to think that the presence of the vicar was of some comfort to those who did. Nor was the application to tombstones, but to the parapet of the church tower and the mullions of the chancel windows. It is, in fact, one of the little secrets of the stone-mason's craft, rather older than our modern niceties of the sacred and profane.

I am, dear sir,
Yours sincerely,
G. R. Dunstan.

Sutton Courtney Vicarage,
Abingdon, Berkshire.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Cosmic Christ. By Allan D. Galloway. Nisbet. 16s.

Dr Galloway's thesis may be given in his own words: "In her efforts to interpret the significance of the Christ in relation to the world, the Church has been forced to see in him and his work either

[1] See Theology, October 1951, p. 384; December 1951, pp. 467 f.

the simple condemnation of the natural order, or else the revelation and fulfilment of a meaning already latent in the natural order, however partial and obscured it may have been. This is the choice . . . between various forms of dualism on the one hand and the doctrine of cosmic redemption on the other" (p. 238). The book is divided into four parts. In the first part the theme of cosmic redemption is traced in its Biblical origins. Judaism, rejecting the dualistic implications of other-worldly eschatology, was forced to extend the reference of the redemptive aspect of the covenant to cover the whole of environment, and did so by the use of paradoxical apocalyptic symbol. In the New Testament the theme is present by symbolic implication in the Gospels (the overcoming of demonic forces), and becomes explicit at a conceptual level of thought in the Christology of St Paul and St John. Part II deals with the systematic working out of the doctrine in the Patristic period. The issue between the Gnostics and the School of Alexandria is illuminated from this point of view, but neither party was prepared to admit that the physical cosmos is involved in the redemptive process in a positive way. Irenaeus too failed to "produce a re-interpretation of this aspect of the Biblical faith in the form of a philosophic doctrine of cosmic redemption", because he fell back on a literal interpretation of the apocalyptic symbols in his zeal to oppose the allegorical interpretation of Gnostic other-worldliness. Part III, "Transition to a new phase", begins with an outline of the medieval story of how man's outward environment is related to the goodness and redeeming love of God. With a passing nod to the Protestant Reformers, "very much preoccupied with problems of inner personal experience" and therefore not inclined to make the doctrine of cosmic redemption a central theological issue, we come to the rise of modern natural science, which meant that the study of nature was being formed into a closed system from which all reference to God was deliberately excluded. And so to Kant, whose story is that "while the kingdom of God may be immanent in the inner moral life, it has no significance for the outward physical world at all" (pp. 145). Dr Galloway maintains the most interesting thesis that this position has essentially the same theological implications as the Gnostic dualism which the early Church had to counter by reasserting the cosmic significance of the work of Christ. To meet this deplorable position, Hegel offered a re-interpretation of Christ's cosmic significance as it bears on the problems, both of the separation of the knowing self from the reality known, and of the relation of the natural world to our standards of ultimate value. Hegel's work suggests to Dr Galloway that our central problem is "to show how the redemptive act of God makes possible the fulfilment of personal life in an impersonal environment in such a way that all experience becomes an encounter with God" (p. 196). In Part IV he does so, in terms which will not be unfamiliar to those who have read Farmer and Tillich, but the story he tells about "the overcoming of the 'It' in Christ" is his own, and he tells it with moving effect.

The book is an exciting one, and is written with power and

lucidity. My criticism of it as a whole would be that Dr Galloway's respect for "the terms of systematic, objective thought, which is the necessary vehicle of philosophical theology", has led him to take for granted an understanding of the Gospel the adequacy of which he never tests. The theology of cosmic redemption must be controlled by our understanding of the redemptive act. But when that act is characterized as Christ sacrificing his existence to the integrity of his Ultimate Meaning, one asks what has been left out. The book draws attention, it is true, to one aspect only of man's predicament—namely, his subjection to and deliverance from the "demonic" in nature. But, absorbing though it is, it seems to afford one more proof that this aspect cannot be dealt with in abstraction from the problem of the "demonic" in history. It is tempting to take up too comfortable an attitude in face of the Bible's eschatological symbolism, if, under the influence of Hegelianism and "personalism", one sits lightly to the moral and historical core of the Gospel as it engages the mind of a theologian of cosmic redemption like P. T. Forsyth, for instance, in his *Christian Ethic of War*. What is offered by Dr Galloway in Part IV is a rather thin and distorted version of the matter. Parts I-III, which are a joy to read, and which contain brilliant analyses of obscure matters, must be taken with caution because they are so carefully designed to lead up to Part IV. Nevertheless, I gladly pay my humble tribute to the great merits of a bright new star in the theological firmament. I hope that in subsequent books he will translate his quotations. And I would submit that theological publishers are ill advised to paint the lily and insult the intelligence of the British reading public by printing on the dust-cover a review of their own devising. I notice misprints on pp. 63, 115 (? "Liberal" instead of *Liberal*), and 154.

W. A. Whitehouse.

University of Durham.

Two Types of Faith By Martin Buber. Translated by N. P. Goldhawk. Routledge and Kegan Paul. 12s. 6d.

There is so much in this latest book by Buber for which every student of the New Testament will be grateful that it would be ungrateful to attempt to enter into an argument in a brief review. Yet the framework of this book is bound to become the subject of argument. For Buber has delivered a series of shrewd and forceful blows against the Pauline version of Christianity. Yet the attack is so courteous and charitable that it is almost unfair to call it an attack; on the other hand, to let the contrast implied in the title of the book pass without mention would be to beg the very question. For the two types of faith of which Buber speaks are the faith of "trust" in a person and the faith of "assent", or the belief *that* something is true. The first he finds in Israel (including the Jesus of the Synoptics), the second in Paul, in the main lines of Christianity, and particularly in the theology and life-attitude of our day.

Buber's position, however, is so subtly qualified and so richly and

tellingly developed in the course of the seventeen short meditations on Biblical themes (mainly Synoptic and Pauline), that it is impossible to do more than draw attention to it. I think that he is almost right about almost everything; and it would be impertinent merely to praise this work for its profundity and its expression of a deep understanding of the trust which lies at the heart of every real religious situation. These are qualities which English readers have already come to expect in his writings. The grand question which arises, however, is whether this opposition between Jesus and Paul is really fundamental to the Christian texts; or whether there is not another, larger question which includes this one—whether Jesus, even in the Synoptics, is not more than the "big brother", more than the consummator of Israel, more than the teacher of trust and immediacy towards God. The fundamental clue seems to lie in the clear insight as developed, for instance, by Kierkegaard (though in the context of a contrast with Socrates, but still valid in the connexion too), that in Jesus the Teacher is given with the teaching, and the two are not separable. The fact that the Christian belief that the Messiah has come, and the new age already broken in, is a belief *that* something is true does not exclude the fact that at the heart of this Christian belief there is also, and *in* this belief, a relation of trust, a turning to God. The two go together. Do they not always? I do not believe *that* something is true without at the same time trusting in the way—and in matters of man's destiny, my destiny, trusting in the One who shows the way, so that the equation becomes possible that he *is* the way.

Within this framework of a distinction between the two types of faith (which is nevertheless valid for everything except the final coalescence in Christian faith of the teaching and the Teacher, truth and being) Buber's work opens up a wide field, and there are important specific points of exegesis (e.g. Paul's interpretation of the Torah) which call for expert appraisal. Yet I wish Buber would later examine again the nature of Paul's theology of mediation. More needs to be said about the kind of mythology in whose terms Paul thinks; it does not seem sufficient to describe his theology as "a faith-intercourse with mediating powers". Bultmann's most recent work on the mythology of the New Testament is cardinal for an understanding of how Paul's theology may, for all its propositional nature, be seen as a true unfolding of the same situation present when Jesus calls for absolute personal trust.

These remarks are intended simply to encourage readers to take up this new book of Buber's; in every chapter there is a wealth of insight which can force us beyond conventional attitudes.

R. Gregor Smith.

London.

Responsibility. By Sir Walter Moberly. Oxford University Press. 5s.

In this essay, which consists of three lectures delivered as the

Riddell Memorial Lectures in the University of Durham, Sir Walter Moberly has given a wider public a stimulating treatment of his theme, which approaches the matter from a fresh angle and compels the reader to re-examine his own beliefs on responsibility.

Having distinguished moral and legal responsibility as liability, respectively, to moral condemnation and legal penalty, the author sets over against each other the psychological and medical view that responsibility in either sense is often, or even always, a fiction, and that therefore "the offender is to be regarded as a sick man to be healed", and the legal outlook which assumes responsibility in the interests both of society and of the individual concerned; and he then inquires how the Christian concept of responsibility is related to these opposing contentions.

The answer is that it has affinities with both but is identical with neither. It has often been assumed that the Christian concept is the ideal at which the legal idea aims; but, in fact, the latter does not even aim at poetic justice, "a precise allocation of individual awards in accordance with individual desert", while, in turn, poetic justice not only fails to satisfy both heart and head, but is also sub-Christian. For on the Christian view (*a*) the whole individual, not just his individual acts, is pronounced guilty, and, into the bargain, he is revealed as "caught in a corporate entanglement which is communal and even racial", and (*b*) the Christian attitude to sinners is one of grace and charity which "bursts the bounds of retributive justice, of desert and individual responsibility".

This Christian concept is further elaborated by means of a critical examination of relevant points in the writings of Dr F. R. Tennant and Professor H. D. Lewis, in the course of which Sir Walter rejects as abstract and artificial their attempt to divide human life into that for which a man is responsible and that for which he is not and to restrict the former to such "action as is due to his own free, conscious choice", and also rebuts their denial of collective responsibility. In the spiritual life these moralistic distinctions are irrelevant, and moral advance may actually involve "a voluntary, and apparently quixotic, embracing of a liability that could have been disputed"; while the Christian attitude to the wrong-doer is one of charity which "supersedes justice as well as fulfils it".

This is an impressive argument which amply repays careful study; and surely in its principal conclusions it reflects the realities of the Gospel of grace. If there is any criticism it is that, allowing that justice, liability to legal penalty, and even to moral condemnation, are all superseded within the context of God's grace, we think there is an even more fundamental sense of responsibility, which is never superseded, without which grace and forgiveness would not be what they are, and which is no less individual because it has a collective side.

N. H. G. Robinson.

Rothesay,
Isle of Bute.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW TESTAMENT. By Richard Heard. A. and C. Black. 12s. 6d.

The road of theological studies is strewn with introductions to the New Testament for the uninstructed reader. This book adds yet another to the list. Of its kind it is a useful addition. Its purpose, Mr Heard tells us in the introductory chapter, is primarily religious: he writes to help the ordinary Christian man or woman to read the New Testament intelligently and at the same time to reconcile the findings of New Testament criticism with some of the cardinal tenets of our religion. To use his own words, he sets out "to concentrate the attention of the reader on the religious implication of modern New Testament criticism and to encourage him to follow up the evidence for himself with the more intensive study of the text and the important books and commentaries to which it is the function of an introduction to lead him".

The book is readably written. But at the end one is left with the impression that the treatment of many of the critical and exegetical problems of the New Testament is rather flimsy. The religious interest has perhaps at times unduly asserted itself: but, whether for this or some other reason, Mr Heard certainly tends to be, in his treatment of his subject, what (to use a political analogy) might be termed a Tory-reformer.

Two samples of these tendencies must suffice. First, in the section which deals with the Acts of the Apostles, though the reader is given to understand that there are certain difficulties about taking the first fifteen chapters too seriously as evidence of the history of the Palestinian Church, he is not seriously confronted with the weight of the problems involved nor adequately prepared for the rude shocks which will await him when he "follows up the evidence for himself with the more intensive study of the text and the important books and commentaries". On the important question of the comparison of Galatians 1 and 2 with Acts 11 and 15 he has little to say—indeed, only three sentences, the gist of which is contained in these words: "It is unlikely that there would have been many Christians in Greece c. A.D. 80 who could have given him (Luke) much information of value about the earliest Palestinian church. . . . There is nothing surprising, therefore, in the varieties between Paul's already accurate record of his visits to Jerusalem (in Galatians 1 and 2) and Luke's version of Paul's movements; they are reasonably to be ascribed, at least in large part, to Luke's failure to remember the exact sequence of events and their significance."

And, secondly, the section on the Epistle of James begs many questions and gives the impression of an over-anxiety on the part of Mr Heard to give the Epistle respectability. Reasons which have led critics to doubt the authenticity of the Epistle are dismissed on grounds of pious possibilities. For example, in regard to the lack of any appeal in the Epistle to the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus, he says: "it is better to take the silence of James, like that of Jude, as an indication of the way in which the brethren of Jesus proclaimed their faith." To the question of how James could write such good

Greek he answers: "There were in Jerusalem Christians fully capable of translating James's words into fluent Greek, as can be seen from the procedure followed in comparing a letter to the Gentile Christians of Syria and Cilicia after the Council of Jerusalem in A.D. 49"—we may note the assumption of the exact historicity of the statement in Acts 15! And to account for the slowness of the Epistle in acquiring canonical recognition he says: "The reasons . . . must be sought in the limited circulation which it enjoyed in the early period, and in the untheological nature of the Epistle. . . . The original prestige of James . . . soon waned when the Church of Jerusalem lost its position of leadership. . . . The very simplicity of the Epistle, and its lack of historical data, helped to diminish its importance." Is a chain where every link is a weak one strong enough to stand the strain of upholding the traditional view about the Epistle of James?

L. JOHN COLLINS.

LONDON.

SHORTER NOTICES

HYMNS OF THE TEMPLE. By Norman Snaith. S.C.M. Press. 7s. 6d.

This small but valuable book consists of six chapters. In the first, which is in many ways the most original and interesting, Dr Snaith gives an account of how the Psalter attained its special place and character in the English Bible, and then breaks new ground in his suggestions concerning its development into five books and in his comparison of its poetry with the recently discovered poems of Ugarit, a city which flourished on the coast near Damascus about the time of Hammurabi (c. 1656 B.C.). "Ugarit poetry", he sums up, "represents substantially the kind of Canaanite-Syrian poetry which the Hebrews encountered when they entered the country", and "the Israelites took over everything, language, culture, poetic style, and even the religion" and transformed it. The likeness of their name for God, "El", to "Il", the chief god of Ugarit, is significant. But "great as are the similarities, it is the differences that matter most". However primitive some of the religion behind the Jewish Psalms—and this Dr Snaith emphasizes in his subsequent exposition of individual Psalms—the really interesting thing is the new thought-forms given to this primitive material by the Jewish writers. Throughout this chapter Dr Snaith makes attractive use not only of his knowledge of Hebrew and of the Ugarit writings, but also of Jewish liturgical practice both ancient and modern. He then takes five Psalms and, often giving his own translations, in each case first brings out some fundamental idea which lies behind it, then develops it by reference to other Bible passages, and finally discusses its transmutation in Jesus Christ. The Psalms thus treated are Psalm 42–43, 44, 46, 50, and 73. The first he attributes to a priest exiled by Nehemiah in his ruthless policy of racial purity. There follows a discussion of the Christian doctrine of grace based on the meaning of "chesed" and the faithfulness and mercy of God in his covenant relationship with

Israel. Psalm 44, attributed to a writer of the same group, who has been accused of debasing his people's religion and stock by mixing with the people of the land, provides as its theme "What does constitute true purity of religion?" Psalm 50, entitled "The High God speaks", starts from primitive conceptions of God in the Ugarit writings as sun and darkness; and Psalm 73, which raises the haunting Jewish problem "Why do the wicked prosper?" is made the occasion of a review of Jewish, sub-Christian and finally Christian answers. Even if much of this is familiar to Hebrew scholars, Dr Snaith has rendered a service to the ordinary reader in bringing the Psalter to life by this very readable work of his.

BRISTOL. J. R. PEACEY.

THE SCANDAL OF CHRISTIANITY. By Emil Brunner. S.C.M. Press. 8s. 6d.

"Where it (the gospel) is not foolishness and scandalous in the sense of the apostles, it is certainly not the gospel, but some kind of idealism disguised in gospel terminology." With this warning Brunner ends these lectures, which form a useful short introduction to his theology. There is little here that he has not said before, but he succeeds in saying it concisely and lucidly in a foreign tongue. Those who read the book hoping to find a penetrating discussion of the nature of Christian paradox will be disappointed: Brunner does not go far beyond saying that what is clear to love is opaque to logic. He confines himself to those Christian doctrines that give most offence to the philosopher: Historical Revelation, the Triune God, Original Sin, the Mediator, the Resurrection.

Sometimes Brunner's remarks are quite startling—"In the narrative of the synoptic gospels we read again and again that Jesus when approaching possessed persons met with the utmost resistance" (p. 1); "Historical criticism has transformed the gospels into a field of ruins" (p. 25); "Even where he is called the Creator, the idea that God can be what he is without a universe is hardly possible within a philosophical doctrine of God: at any rate, I do not know of any great philosophical theologian who has put forward such an idea" (p. 37). The last quotation reveals an apparent failure to come to grips with the "philosophia perennis" (cf. Aquinas, *S.Th.*, I, xix, 3c). Does this lie at the root of Brunner's radical distinction between the living God and the *deus philosophorum*?

The short compass of these lectures necessarily precludes much more than a cursory dogmatic apologia in which the basic credal truths are mingled with more controversial matters. The dustcover calls the book "a brilliant exposition of the biblical teaching". And so it is within these limits. But the mystery of the Blessed Trinity might provide a better starting-point than the irrationality of sin for an exposition of the "Scandal of Christianity".

WESTCOTT HOUSE, CAMBRIDGE. HUGH MONTEFIORE.

A Short Comparative History of Religions. By Theodore H. Robinson. Duckworth's Theology Series. Second Edition. 7s. 6d.

This is a very clear and useful study of the subject, written by a well-known and eminent Baptist scholar, who has himself specialized in Semitic studies. The first edition appeared in 1926, and after a quarter of a century it has now been re-issued with a careful revision of the earlier chapters, and the addition of a new bibliography.

The titles of the chapters serve to indicate the author's method of approach. Thus he begins with what he calls Proto-religion, and then passes to Animism, and subsequently to Polytheism. This would seem to imply that he considers the earliest type of religious belief to be pre-pluralistic. But as he himself admits, the evidence as to the chronological sequence in which animatism precedes animism is conflicting. It is not quite certain that savages have the power to make such abstract concepts as "mana" in general, and that what they think about is "somebody's mana", on the mana of some animal or thing such as a spear-thrower, and in this case "mana" would be in the plural. And again, different varieties of primitive belief might have emerged and existed concurrently, while the difference between pluralistic animism and polytheism is largely that between rural and urban communities. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the pre-animistic or animatistic mana-type of belief completely disappears in polytheism. It may be always there as an undertone, with a neuter word to indicate its presence, such as *numen* or *το θεῖον*, and may re-emerge when people begin to philosophize over the objects of their belief, as in Hinduism and Greek free thought.

Another interesting mode of dividing the subject employed by Dr Robinson is that into religions with a philosophy, and philosophical religions. In the former category he would place Hinduism, and one supposes that if pressed he would also add Christianity. In the latter category he would put Confucianism and Buddhism. But again one would question whether this is really a valid distinction, since Confucianism as a state religion in China, when it was a going concern, was closely linked up with the offering of sacrifices in temples, while Buddhism, although it has no sacrifices, but only what might be called "choir-offices with sermons", is certainly as we know it an institutional religion, with temples and votive acts performed in them.

The author's conclusion is that the true greatness of Christ begins to dawn on us only when we have seen something of the way in which other faiths have ministered to the human spirit, and with this we may well agree.

Cambridge. A. C. Bouquet.

The Buddhist Way of Life. By F. Harold Smith.
Islam. By A. S. Tritton. Hutchinson's University Library. 7s. 6d. each.

These are two useful additions to the section on the world re-

ligions in Messrs Hutchinson's popular series of introductory textbooks. Their approach to the two religions is different. The late Professor Smith gives an historical survey of Buddhism, tracing its early sources, the growth of the tradition, the emergence of the two great schools, Hinayana and Mahayana, with their various sects, and the spread of the religion over the eastern world, notably in China and Japan. Dr Smith is a sympathetic writer on Buddhism, of which he had made a special study during the last years of his life. A careful reading of this book will soon convince the reader that generalizations about Buddhism, as about any widespread developed religion, are to be avoided. It is a great pity that the final chapter, *East and West*, is so brief, as this is bound to be of particular interest to the philosopher and theologian. Dr Smith has no doubts about the superiority of Christianity in the sphere of religion; but he believes that the empirically minded West has much to learn from the intuitional epistemology of the East. Those who wish to pursue his thesis further should read Moore's *Philosophy: East and West*, cited in Dr Smith's bibliography.

Professor Tritton's survey of Islam is nearer the conventional type of introductory handbook than Professor Smith's. He writes clearly, and does not overburden his readers with a mass of indigestible detail. Apart fom the initial chapter on Muhammed and the Quran, his treatment is not historical, but outlines the several main features of the religion. The chapters on the Islamic sects and mysticism, social life, and modern movements, are specially useful as giving a succinct recent account. The glossary of Islamic terms is a welcome addendum, and is always desirable in this kind of book. Dr Tritton has not, however, deemed it part of his task to offer any comparison between Islam and Christianity.

The value of producing short up-to-date surveys of the great religions every few years is undeniable. Yet there are so many competent "introductions" of this kind. There are fewer comparative studies of the main philosophical and theological ideas of the great religions; and most Western readers, who have no intention of becoming specialists in the study of this or that religion, would welcome guidance in this direction. The dispassionate study of religions, as such, is something of an academic luxury: on the other hand, comparative theology is a valuable complement to natural theology, and cannot safely be dispensed with by Christians in the present-day world.

University College of North Wales, Bangor. D. W. Gundry.

Satan. Edited by Père Bruno de Jesus-Marie, O.C.D. Sheed and Ward. 30s.

It is a deep saying of Whichcote's that no reasonable account of wickedness can be given, for reason is against it. And if we cannot expect from one writer a coherent examination of the Prince of Incoherence, how much less can we expect it from the thirty writers

of this book. Indeed, much of their argument turns on Satan's essential ambiguity. Thus evil is mere deficiency of being, nothing in itself, yet we find it every day more agonizingly real and obdurate; the devil is weak because divided against himself—even cannibalistic—yet he is still an angel and more than a match for us; he is much better informed than we are, yet, because he lacks the imaginative sympathy by which to understand any creature as it is for itself, he is always superficial and misinformed; he is as clever as himself, yet the universal ass; immense, yet tiny; one, yet legion; exalted, yet grovelling at the very abyss of being. Again, he is the source of all wickedness, yet not responsible for our frailty which is his opportunity; he gets at us through nerves and glands, sense and imagination, till he possesses us, yet (we are assured) our free will remains inviolable. When we are least alive to him we are most vulnerable to him, yet he likes us to take him too seriously, for this gives him a foothold on the reality from which he has fallen; he welcomes equally our naïve portrait of him as Old Nick with horns and tail, and our sophisticated portrait of him as a state of mind, as merely psychological bedevilment. He is the proud father of all the lies about himself; therefore they are never mere lies. Even the truth about him is a kind of untruth.

In spite of such infernal but unavoidable obscurities, this massive symposium is not chaotic: its framework of Catholic doctrine, and its scholarship and good writing, help to pull it together. The articles on possession and exorcism and witchcraft tell an appalling tale of cruelty and superstition; but again, bogus devilry is real devilry when it does the devil's work so well. And the authors do try to give the psychiatrist his due. Though there is much in *Satan* which the critical will find dubious if not incomprehensible, this is an opportune book, and the main questions it raises are vital for us now. How can we acknowledge the Holy Spirit working in men, and deny its satanic counterpart? For the Christian, angels and devils belong to revelation: we believe (against all the evidence) that we still believe in them. But reason itself suggests that we should use our inside information about the universe—namely, ourselves—as some guide to the whole, and so see the good and the evil in us to be not exclusively ours, but continuous with a good and an evil that are extra-human. Though it is on earth and in ourselves that we find the light and the darkness contending, it belongs to the darkness to hide both its own cosmic scope and the infinity of the Light which dispels it.

IPSWICH. D. E. HARDING.

ANGRY YOUNG MAN. By Leslie Paul. Faber and Faber. 18s.

Mr Paul's books, *The Annihilation of Man* and *The Meaning of Human Existence*,[1] were the outcome of his discovery of the Christian faith. *Angry Young Man* is an autobiographical work which covers the period from 1922 to 1941 and brings him to the threshold of that discovery. Between the World Wars he was sustained by

[1] See review in THEOLOGY, September 1949, pp. 352 f.

various forms of secular idealism, and took an active part in many progressive movements. He is a gifted writer and he knows how to recapture moods and enthusiasms that are past. His story is full of human and historical interest. A. R. V.

THE CHURCH UNIVERSAL IN HISTORY. By G. C. Lindsay Grant. H. B. Copinger. 4s. 6d.

THE GROWING DAY. By F. F. Bruce. Second Thoughts Library. Paternoster Press. 6s.

AFTER THE APOSTLES. By John Foster. S.C.M. Press. 7s. 6d.

The Church Universal in History gives us in one small volume the whole history of the Christian Church from the Day of Pentecost to, strangely enough, the French revolution. It is written by a layman for laymen and especially for those of the Anglican and Presbyterian Churches, to aid the cause of church unity. Parables from St Matthew and the letters to the seven churches of the Apocalypse are used as keys to the understanding of the five successive epochs into which the history is divided. This leads to some rather strained exegesis.

The author makes every effort to be fair to all points of view and to be at the same time comprehensive, lucid and concise, and he succeeds in this to a great extent in the first four sections of his book, which are admirable condensations of a great mass of material, so that nothing important is omitted yet all is clear, readable, and reliable. Presbyterians may quarrel with his easy assumption of early monarchical episcopacy, with emphasis on authority from above; High Churchmen, with a certain lack of appreciation of the meaning and value of the visible Church, also with his description of mysticism on page 136. But these are small points in an otherwise good and readable book.

When, however, he comes to deal with the Church after the reformation the fact that the author would call himself a member of the "Protestant Established Church" becomes increasingly evident, and the careful balance is lost. From then on the book becomes not so much a history of the Universal Church as of the growth of protestantism. The largest defect of this last section is its curious conclusion at the beginning, and not the end, of the nineteenth century, permissible in a work of specialized scholarship, but not in a general layman's guide to the history of his Church, especially in view of the tremendous development of the world-wide Church in the nineteenth century. The second is the entire omission of any reference to what has been termed the High Church Tradition. There is no reference, for example, to the vigorous spiritual life of the seventeenth century or to the founding of the S.P.G. or the S.P.C.K., yet, later, the L.M.S., the C.M.S., and the British and Foreign Bible Society, all have a place, though at least one of them is out of the period covered. There is, therefore, no mention of missionary activity before the nineteenth century except that of the Roman Catholics; not even Bishop Seabury is included. The book ends with a declaration of evangelical faith.

The Growing Day is a popular exposition of church history from A.D. 70 to A.D. 313, the second of a series of three books on the early Church. It gives us again much of what we have already in Dr Wand's *History of the Early Church*, and is less clearly written. Doctrinally too much is made to hang upon the Didache as evidence for early Church doctrine and practice, when there is at least some doubt whether that book may not refer to conditions in a montanist sect outside the main stream of the Church's life. There is also a deep misunderstanding of Christian sacramental life. The Christian doctrine of baptismal regeneration is not derived from the mystery religions, nor is it true to speak of Christian ministers assuming priestly functions in course of time, nor of the Sacraments as later developments of an external religion when inner inspiration had grown dim. There is too much Scriptural evidence against such views. There is, however, a welcome section on Christianity farther east, which is usually neglected. But for a book to be truly popular there must be a certain freshness of approach, which is lacking here.

This is, in fact, exactly what we do find in Professor John Foster's *After the Apostles*, which deals with the same period but has a truly popular appeal. After the manner of his broadcasts it is a sound, readable, and exciting history, which makes the early Church come alive for us to-day. His examples of early Christian street preaching make us understand why Christianity spread so rapidly. These men really had something to say. The book is full of quotations from the early fathers translated by the author into good and alive modern English. Early miracles are paralleled by similar ones in recent years, so that the continuity of inspiration in the Church is realized, while we see that the usual modern intellectual's objections to the Christian faith were all made during the second and third centuries and very effectively answered. Anyone interested in church history, whether previously instructed or not, will enjoy this book. It does not claim to be a comprehensive history of the period, but rather to give the spiritual climate of the age. It is well worth buying, keeping, and lending to that friend who cannot as yet "see much in Christianity".

BRADFORD. E. M. KAY.

LES SACRAMENTS DANS L'ÉVANGILE JOHANNIQUE. La vie de Jésus et le culte de l'église primitive. By Oscar Cullmann. Presses Universitaires de France. 400 frs.

In this study of the Sacraments in the Fourth Gospel Dr Cullmann argues that the Fourth Evangelist has been guided in his choice of material by theological and ecclesiastical principles. This does not mean that the Fourth Gospel has no value as an historical record of the life of Jesus. The Jesus of history and the Christ of the Church are one, and it is Dr Cullmann's purpose to demonstrate this identity with regard to the teaching about the Sacraments. He regards the Fourth Gospel as a document of the highest importance in our search for a more complete knowledge of the sacramental faith of the primitive Church. He believes that questions of "cultus" occupy the

mind of John far more than has been generally recognized. He finds references to this sacramental faith in the following passages: John 1. 6–8, 19–34; 2. 1–11; 2. 12–22; 3. 1–21; 3. 22–36; 4. 1–30; 5. 1–19; 5. 17; 6. 1–13, 26–65; 9. 1–39; 13. 1–20; 13. 31–17. 26; 19. 34. An examination of these passages shows that according to the belief of the Fourth Evangelist the presence of God is no longer tied up with the Temple but with the Person of Christ. Because Christ is now the centre of worship all the means employed in the past to establish a liaison between God and man have been abolished. They are replaced by the sacraments of Baptism and Holy Communion which provide us with access to Christ and participation in his grace. The material forms of water, bread, and wine, are as important in this respect as the material flesh of Christ was for the revelation of God's glory in time. Both Sacraments are closely associated with the death, resurrection, and ascension, of Christ and can only be understood in the light of these events. Dr Cullmann's exegesis shows keen insight into the mind of the Fourth Evangelist, and the book throws light upon our understanding of the sacramental faith of the primitive Church.

HORSFORTH. E. KENNETH LEE.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(*Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.*)

A.P.C.K. (DUBLIN): T. W. E. Drury, *Unforgotten: an Irish clergyman recollects Dublin and Belfast in the nineteenth century* (10s. 6d.).

BASIL BLACKWELL: H. V. P. Nunn, *Christian Inscriptions* (3s.).

CHURCH INFORMATION BOARD: *Human Sterilization: some principles of Christian ethics* (1s.).

CLONMORE AND REYNOLDS: F. Hayward, *The Vatican Council* (4s. 6d.).

C.M.S.: A. J. Drewett, *Not Many Mighty: a study of the Biblical Idea of the Remnant* (3s.).

FAITH PRESS: H. de Candole and P. Cowley (Ed.), *The People of God* (6s.).

HEFFER: *The Approach to Christian Unity* (4s.).

LUTTERWORTH PRESS: W. R. Forrester, *Christian Vocation* (12s. 6d.); Nicodemus, *The Kingdom of the Real* (15s.); Hans Lietzmann, *The Era of the Church Fathers* (18s.).

MOWBRAY: J. E. Anderson, *36 Outline Sermons for Country Parishes* (3s.); F. Macnutt (Ed.), *The Prayer Manual* (8s. 6d.); Bishop of London, *What the Church of England stands for* (7s. 6d.).

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS: J. M. Todd, *Prayers and Services for Christian Festivals* (8s. 6d.).

PATERNOSTER PRESS: Erich Sauer, *The Dawn of World Redemption* (10s. 6d.); P. White, *Jungle Doctor to the Rescue* (4s. 6d.); E. Sauer, *The Triumph of the Crucified* (10s. 6d.).

S.C.M. PRESS: Max Warren, *The Christian Mission* (7s. 6d.); *Ways of Worship: the report of a theological commission on faith and order* (21s.).

S.P.C.K.: L. Scott, *The Window* (a pageant of church history) (7s. 6d.); A. J. Appasamy, *The Christian Task in Independent India* (12s. 6d.); Ivor Thomas, *Did Mary rise from the dead?* (6d.); N. Gorodetzky, *St Tikhon Zadonsky* (21s.); K. Chivers, *Does Genesis make sense?* (3s. 6d.); H. P. Thompson, *Into All Lands* (42s.); P. G. Holden, *Pascal* (1s.).

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